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The California State Courts and Consumer Class
Actions for Antitrust Violations
Federal antitrust laws and class action procedures restrict recovery
by classes of consumer plaintiffs for antitrust violations. In contrast,
California antitrust laws and class action procedures permit recovery
for similar violations of California antitrust laws. As a result of these
differences, many class actions have been filed in California courts to
recover for violations of the California antitrust law, the Cartwright
Act.' Several of these actions concern the same activities that are the
subject of antitrust suits alleging violations of the Sherman Act,2 filed
in federal courts.3 Because parallel state and federal antitrust suits
often are brought by different classes of plaintiffs, the possibility of
multiple liability for the same anticompetitive acts arises.
Without attempting to provide an exhaustive analysis of either
federal or California antitrust laws, this Comment sets forth several im-
portant differences between federal and California antitrust remedies.
First, the Comment contrasts the federal and California antitrust laws
relating to the recovery of damages by indirect purchasers. Under fed-
eral law, consumers who have not purchased directly from an antitrust
violator usually will be denied recovery. Under the Cartwright Act,
however, such an indirect purchaser commonly will be permitted to
1. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16760 (West 1976 & Supp. 1981).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
3. Several antitrust actions involving allegations of antitrust violations similar to those
in concurrent federal actions have been filed in California state courts. E.g., In re Sugar
Antitrust Litigation, 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978); Pate v. Boise Cascade Corp., No. 765742
(Super. Ct. City & County of San Francisco, filed April 16, 1980) (related to In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litigation, 446 F. Supp. 759 (J.P.M.L. 1978) (consolidated in E.D. Pa.));
Goldberg v. CPC International, No. 765217 (Super. Ct. City & County of San Francisco,
filed March 31, 1980) (related to In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 486 F. Supp.
929 (J.P.M.L. 1980) (consolidated in D.NJ.)); Esprit De Corp. v. Alton Box Board Co., No.
750975 (Super. Ct. City & County of San Francisco, filed March 22, 1979) (related to In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 441 F. Supp. 921 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (consolidated
in S.D. Tex.)); Greenberg v. Leviton Mfg. Co., No. 759734 (Super. Ct. City & County of San
Francisco, filed Oct. 30, 1979) (related to In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 444 F.
Supp. 1348 (3.P.M.L. 1977) (consolidated in E.D.N.Y.)). Recently, in suits alleging vertical
price-fixing, which arguably may involve direct purchasers, several actions in California,
Louie v. Cuisinarts, Inc., No. 881943 (Super. Ct. City & County of San Francisco, filed Oct.
1, 1980), Reynolds v. Cuisinarts, Inc., No. 771845 (Super. Ct. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, filed Sept. 29, 1980) and Gayer v. Cuisinarts, Inc., No. 458970 (Super. Ct. San Diego
County, filed Sept. 23, 1980) (removed to federal court, see note 124 infra), relate to federal
actions consolidated as In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 651
(J.P.M.L. 1981) (consolidated in D. Conn.).
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recover damages for antitrust violations. Second, the Comment con-
trasts three critical aspects of federal and state class action procedure as
they relate to large classes of consumers: the requirement of notice to
members of a prospective class, the extent to which defendants can be
ordered to bear the costs of notice, and the use of fluid recovery by
class plaintiffs to make the distribution of damages awarded in a class
action manageable. Although federal law discourages the certification
of large consumer classes, California state courts are relatively liberal
in certifying them.
Finally, this Comment discusses two problems arising from the in-
creased use of California courts for redress of injury from antitrust vio-
lations. The first problem is procedural. The second problem has
constitutional dimensions.
The first problem arises when a defendant seeks to remove state
court class actions, based upon the Cartwright Act, to federal court on
the grounds that the state actions present a federal question. Although
the Ninth Circuit has held that a state suit filed by indirect purchasers
cannot be removed on federal question grounds, 4 a recent United
States Supreme Court decision suggests that an antitrust suit filed in
state court under state antitrust laws by direct purchasers can be re-
moved on federal question grounds.5
The second problem arises because federal law denies recovery to
most indirect purchasers, while California law allows them to recover.
Because of the danger of multiple liability for the same conduct, de-
fendants argue that the California Cartwright Act's remedy for indirect
purchasers is preempted by the federal antitrust law, which denies re-
covery. This Comment, however, suggests that this preemption analy-
sis is premature. The state courts may reconcile the two antitrust
schemes and prevent multiple treble damage recovery by offsetting the
state court award in appropriate cases.
The Consumer's Right to Recover Damages
in Antitrust Actions
Consumers who have directly purchased an item whose price has
been increased as a result of an antitrust violation have an unquestion-
able right to recover damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.6 In
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,7 however, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Clayton Act does not permit recovery by most con-
sumers who do not purchase the object of the antitrust violation di-
4. In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 588 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1978).
5. Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
7. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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rectly from the antitrust violators. For example, in an industry in
which goods are sold by manufacturers to wholesalers, who in turn sell
to retailers, a consumer who purchased from the retailer ordinarily
could not recover damages for an antitrust violation unless the retailer
committed the violation. If an unlawful antitrust conspiracy existed
among manufacturers, or between manufacturers and wholesalers,
which results in an increased price to the consumer, the consumer can-
not recover from the manufacturers or wholesalers. In addition, the
consumer cannot sue the retailer for passing on all or part of the price
increase, unless the retailer itself committed antitrust violations. Fed-
eral law generally permits only the direct purchaser to recover dam-
ages, and the measure of the direct purchaser's recovery is the total
overcharges attributable to the antitrust violation, regardless of whether
the direct purchaser absorbed the overcharge, thereby suffering dimi-
nution of profits, or passed the overcharge along to indirect purchaser
customers.9
The Illinois Brick decision was based on Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
UnitedShoe Machinery Corp. , 1o in which the Supreme Court refused to
allow the defendant to offer proof in an antitrust damages action that
the plaintiff had passed the illegal overcharges along to its customers.I1
The Court stated that the economic evidence required to prove that an
overcharge had been passed on to indirect purchasers would be "virtu-
ally unascertainable."' 2 The Court reasoned that, if the pass-on de-
fense were allowed, "[t]reble-damage actions would often require
additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evi-
dence and complicated theories."' 3 Thus, rather than burden federal
plaintiffs and the federal courts with a procedural morass of elaborate
economic evidence, the Court refused to allow the defendants to con-
test the fact of injury on the grounds that the plaintiff passed the anti-
trust overcharge along to indirect purchasers. The Court also reasoned
that private enforcement of the antitrust laws would be encouraged by
precluding the pass-on defense, because direct purchasers, rather than
ultimate consumers, have a greater interest in bringing suit. 14
8. An overcharge is defined as that portion of the purchase price that results from the
antitrust violation. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489
(1968).
9. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 728. In.llinoir Brick, the Court indi-
cated that indirect purchasers could recover damages when market forces had superceded
the effect of their indirect purchaser status, for example, by cost-plus contracts or control
situations. 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petro-
leum Products Antitrust Litigation, 497 F. Supp. 218, 226-27 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
10. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
11. Id at 494.
12. Id at 493.
13. Id
14. See id at 494.
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The Supreme Court was faced with a corollary problem in Illinois
Brick. The plaintiffs purchased buildings that had been constructed
with defendants' cement blocks and alleged that a price-fixing conspir-
acy among cement block manufacturers had caused the buildings to be
overpriced by three million dollars. 15 The plaintiffs were denied recov-
ery because they were only indirect purchasers of the products upon
which prices allegedly had been fixed. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied upon the two reasons enunciated in Hanover Shoe: proof
of passed-on injury is too complex and speculative,' 6 and assuring di-
rect purchasers of a full recovery encourages private enforcement of the
antitrust laws.'
7
The plaintiffs suggested that the Hanover Shoe rule could be modi-
fied to allow defendants to introduce evidence of pass-on charges when
both indirect and direct purchasers had filed suit against antitrust de-
fendants.' 8 The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the
modified rule would encourage large, cumbersome, and complex mul-
ticlass antitrust actions' 9 and that the existence of the rule might allow
the award of multiple damages against defendants. 20 The Court con-
cluded that Hanover Shoe's abolition of pass-on theories as a defense in
antitrust suits should be extended to prohibit the use of pass-on theories
by indirect purchaser plaintiffs.
2'
Soon after the Illinois Brick decision, the California legislature
amended California's antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act, to state ex-
15. 431 U.S. at 726-27.
16. Id at 741-43.
17. Id at 745-47. The Court based its conclusion that allowing indirect purchasers a
damages remedy would lessen private incentive to enforce the antitrust laws on two grounds.
First, the indirect purchaser who might have a smaller individual injury would have less
incentive to sue. Id. at 745. Second, the direct purchaser, faced with increased complexity
and the threat of sharing the recovery, would not sue as readily. Id Direct purchasers,
however, might have less incentive to sue because they are dependent on the relationship
with their suppliers or because they have passed on the injury. See 431 U.S. at 763 & n.23
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions:
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 913-14 & n.115 (1975);
Note, The Debate Over the Passing-On Concept in Antitrust Law. Is it Finally Settled?, 15
Hous. L. REv. 199, 209 (1977).
18. 431 U.S. at 729-30.
19. Id at 731-32.
20. Id at 730.
21. Id at 729-36. Justice Brennan, in dissent, criticized the majority's perception of the
evidentiary difficulties in proving pass-on injuries by citing the Court's sanction of that pro-
cess in price discrimination cases. Id at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Perkins v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969) (permitting tracing of illegal overcharge through four
levels of distribution). Commentators and economists have criticized the Court's perception
of economic difficulties. See, e.g., Cirace, Price-fixing, Privity and the Passing-On Problem in
Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: A Suggested Solution, 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 171, 179-89
(1977); Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions.- An Economic and
LegalAnalysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (1975); Watson, Bad Economics in the Antitrust
[Vol. 33
CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST ACTIONS
pressly that the Cartwright Act afforded a treble damages remedy to
indirect purchasers. 2 The Illinois Brick decision did not directly affect
California's Cartwright Act because the decision was based on the
Courtroom: Illinois Brick and the "Pass-On" Problem, 9 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 69
(1977).
The majority's argument that multiple recoveries were possible was based on the suppo-
sition that direct and indirect purchasers could not be forced to litigate in a single forum.
See 431 U.S. at 730-31. The Court's "avoidance of an indepth discussion of available proce-
dural devices" caused one commentator to discount the importance of this factor. Note,
Antirust: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 374, 380-81 (1978). Other
commentators have suggested that the Court could have considered other procedures, such
as barring subsequent suits on failure to intervene, transferring the cause under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1976), requiring a bond or escrow of prior judgments or settlements until the statute
of limitations runs, or applying equitable set-offs. See, ag., Note, The Debate Over the Pass-
ing-On Concept in Antitrust Law: Is it Finally Settled, 15 Hous. L. REV. 199, 211 (1977);
Note, Anti-Trust Law-Private Actions: The Supreme Court Bars Treble-Damage Suits by
Indirect Purchasers, 56 N.C.L. REv. 341, 350-51 (1978). In any event, interpretations of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 would probably limit consumer class access to federal
damages remedies, thus limiting the possibility of multiple treble damages awards in the
federal courts. See notes 24-85 & accompanying text infra.
It has been suggested that the fear of unmanageably large lawsuits was the major factor
in the Court's decision in llinois Brick. See, e.g., Note, supra, 56 N.C.L. Rav. at 345-47
(1978). Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, did not address this issue specifically. In
light of his firm belief that it was "difficult to see how Congress could have expressed itself
more clearly" that the indirect purchasers had a federal claim for relief, 431 U.S. at 758, he
probably would not have accepted the unmanageability argument.
Congress considered bills repealing iinois Brick in the 95th Congress, see, eg., S. 1874,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), and the 96th Congress, see, e.g., S. 300, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1979). At least one commentator confidently predicted the passage of S. 300. Comment,
CongressionalAuthorization of Indirect Purchaser Treble Damage Claims: 2he Illinois Brick
Wall Crumbles, 47 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1025, 1026 (1979). However, the bill met resistance
from both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys. See Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979:
Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 230-52
(1979) (statements of panel of plaintiffs' attorneys including Perry Goldberg, Harold E.
Kohn, James Sloan, and Guido Saveri); id at 280-90 (statements of panel of defense attor-
neys including Samuel W. Murphy, Jr., Boyden C. Gray, and Robert E. Liedquist). Appar-
ently, the bill has died.
22. "Such action may be brought by any person who is injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, regardless of
whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant." 1978 Cal. Stat.
ch. 536, § 1, at 1693 (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West Supp. 1981)).
The legislature further stated, "The amendment. . . does not constitute a change in, but is
declaratory of, the existing law." 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 536, § 2, at 1693. The Ninth Circuit
had recognized that the California state courts might not follow the federal rule as enunci-
ated in Illinois Brick. See In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978).
But see In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp. 79, 85-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(anticipating that South Carolina state courts would follow Illinois Brick and prevent indi-
rect purchasers' recoveries); Russo & Dublin v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 95 Misc. 2d 344,
407 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (accepting rationale of Illinois Brick and applying it to
New York antitrust law). At least five other states have a statutory remedy for indirect
puchasers. See HAwI REV. STAT. § 480-13(c), -14 (Supp. 1981); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3(A) (Supp. 1981); S.D.
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Court's interpretation of federal antitrust statutes. 23
Class Action Procedures in the Federal and California Courts
The class action is an essential procedural device in many antitrust
actions because the claims of numerous individuals can be litigated in a
single lawsuit without each individual's direct participation. 24 The
availability of this procedure is particularly important in consumer an-
titrust actions in which the ultimate consumer of a product suffered a
relatively small individual injury because the maintenance of a lawsuit
by one individual would be economically infeasible. When each con-
sumer's individual injury is aggregated with other similarly situated
consumers' injuries, however, litigation to recover damages for those
injuries may become economically practical. Several differences be-
tween federal and California class action procedures have significant
effects on consumer antitrust class actions.
The Notice Requirement
An important aspect of the class action procedure upon which Cal-
ifornia and federal courts differ is the requirement of notice to un-
named class members. The class action purports to adjudicate finally
the rights of unnamed class members who do not participate directly in
the lawsuit.25 As a matter of constitutional due process, however, the
rights of an absent class member cannot be subject to a binding final
judgment unless constitutionally effective notice has been given to the
class.26 California and federal law differ on whether constitutionally
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-1-33 (Supp. 1980) (but limiting private class actions); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 133.18(1) (West Supp. 1980-81).
23. 431 U.S. at 726. The Court invited Congress to amend § 4 of the Clayton Act if it
disagreed with the Court's interpretation. Id at 733 n.14. See generally Note, Scaling the
Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L.
REv. 309, 322 n.60, 323-24 (1977); Note, Illinois Brick and Consumer Actions: The Passing
Over of the Passing-On Doctrine, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 361, 362 (1978); Note, Hanover Shoe
Inc. Rule Bars Offensive Use 0/Passing-On Doctrine by Indirect Purchasers, 23 VILL. L. REV.
381, 393 (1978). The California courts, however, traditionally have followed federal anti-
trust decisions in interpreting California's Cartwright Act. See Corwin v. Los Angeles
Newspaper Serv. Bureau, 4 Cal. 3d 842, 852-53, 484 P.2d 953, 959, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785, 791
(1971). Therefore, the California legislature may have felt it important to direct the state
courts to allow indirect purchasers to recover treble damages.
24. See generally Grossman, Class Actions: Manageability and the Fluid Recovery Doc-
trine, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 415 (1972); Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class
Actions Under Federal Rule 23(c)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 506-08 (1972); Note, Damage Distribu-
tion in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 448 (1972).
25. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974); FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(3); Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105 (1966).
26. A judgment is not binding unless notice meets due process requirements. See Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950); Richmond Black
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effective notice is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a class action.27
Federal law
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen IV),28 the United States
Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires
that individual notice to all identifiable class members be given before
a class action brought under Rule 23(b)(3) may proceed. 29 The Court
in Eisen IV was faced with a consumer class, purchasers of stock in
odd-lot transactions, that was estimated to contain six million mem-
bers. Approximately two and one-quarter million members could be
identified from the defendant stock brokers' records.30 The Court rea-
soned that Rule 23, governing class actions in federal courts, was in-
tended to ensure that judgments would bind all parties.3' The plaintiff
argued that he should not be required to provide individual notice to
identifiable class members because Rule 23 should be administered
flexibly to permit maintenance of the action. The plaintiff also argued
that there was no incentive to sue individually because the claims were
too small.32 Rejecting these arguments, the Court held that individual
notice to identifiable class members was an "unambiguous requirement
of Rule 23," which could not be waived by a court. 33
California law
Although California courts have referred to federal interpretations
Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Va. 1974). In Mullane,
the Supreme Court stated that "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action. . ." is required to satisfy due pro-
cess. 339 U.S. at 314. The Court further admonished that "[w]here the name and post office
addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to
means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency." Id at 318.
27. Compare Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975)
with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
28. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The Eisen litigation produced a prodigious number of pub-
lished decisions concerning federal class action procedures. District court opinions are re-
ported at 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 54 F.R.D. 565
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Appellate decisions are reported at 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (Eisen 1); 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II); 479 F.2d 1005
(2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen III).
29. 417 U.S. at 173-77. The Court found that the Rule 23 notice requirement was
designed to fulfill the constitutional due process notice standards articulated in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
30. 417 U.S. at 166-67.
31. Id at 176.
32. Id at 175-76.
33. Id at 176.
January 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of Rule 23, 3 4 they are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Rule.35 California's class action statute does not
contain the detailed procedures outlined in the federal rule,36 and Cali-
fornia's courts have exercised greater discretion than have federal
courts in fashioning class action procedures.
37
California courts have been flexible in their treatment of the extent
of notice required to maintain a class action. In Cart v. Superior
Court,38 a California court distinguished two issues in determining how
extensive notice to the class must be. The court found that the determi-
nation of the extent of notice required to ensure a final judgment, im-
mune from collateral attack, is governed by constitutional due
process, 39 and that the extent of notice necessary to permit the mainte-
nance of a class action in state court is a matter of state procedural
34. California courts may use federal interpretations of Rule 23 as a last resort for
procedural guidance. See note 36 infra.
35. Although the Court in Eisen IV discussed the constitutional notice requirement, its
holding in the case was based on the language of Rule 23. See id at 173-77; see also Cartt v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 968-69, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381 (1975); Jacobi & Cher-
asky, The Effects of Eisen IVand ProposedAmendments of Federal Rule 23, 12 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1, 10-17 (1974); McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities
in Procedure and Substance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1351, 1405 Author's
Note (1974). For an exhaustive list of courts and commentators who have expressed views
on the question of whether Eisen IV is an interpretation of Rule 23 or whether it states a
constitutionally binding rule, see Comment, Cost Allocation in California Class Actions, 13
CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 73 n.57 (1977).
36. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 382 (West 1973) provides: "If the consent of any one who
should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant, the
reason thereof being stated in the complaint; and when the question is one of a common or
general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." See
also SUPERIOR COURT MANUAL FOR CONDUCT OF PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN CLASS Ac-
TIONS (1974). The Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1782 (West
1973 & Supp. 1981), is not applicable to antitrust violations, see id § 1770, but its detailed
class action procedures, see id § 1781, are sometimes used as a guide by trial courts. See
Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 809, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 809
(1971). As a last resort, the California courts may look to Rule 23 and federal cases gov-
erning it for procedural guidance. Id
37. In addition to the three contrasts between the California and federal class action
procedures discussed in this Comment, at least two other features of California class action
law are more favorable to plaintiffs than the corresponding federal procedure. Class mem-
bers may aggregate claims for jurisdictional purposes under California law while they can-
not under federal law. Compare Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 443 P.2d 732, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967) with Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) and Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 299 (1973). Under California law, a class attorney may also
be a named class plaintiff, while under federal law this dual role is disallowed. Compare
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1967) and Saxer v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 7, 18 n.1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 327, 333 n.1 (1975) with Gray-
beal v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973).
38. 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975).
39. Id at 969, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
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law.4° In determining the extent of notice required to certify a class, a
California court relies on a strong state policy favoring consumer class
action sUits.
4 1
In CaraI, the court considered a proposed class of all purchasers of
Chevron gasoline who lived in southern California. The plaintiff
sought to notify the class of the proposed action by newspaper publica-
tion, but the trial court ordered that individual notice be mailed to all
identifiable credit card holders.42 The court of appeal remanded with
instructions that the published notice would be sufficient to maintain
the suit. The court took a pragmatic view of the purpose of notice in a
class action. Although absent consumers arguably could attack the
judgment collaterally, the court reasoned that the small individual
stakes of the plaintiff class members made the collateral attack un-
likely.43 Therefore, notice through publication could achieve a judg-
ment that would be final for practical purposes.44
Costs of Notice
The cost of giving preliminary notice to a large class may be bur-
densome when individual notice must be given.45 Arguably, in an anti-
40. Id at 970, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
41. Id The California Supreme Court explained this policy in Vasquez v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968, 94 Cal. Rpr. 796, 800-01 (1971): "Protection of
unwary consumers from being duped by unscrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost
priority in contemporary society .... Frequently numerous consumers are exposed to the
same dubious practice by the same seller so that proof of the prevalence of the practice as to
one consumer would provide proof for all Individual actions by each of the defrauded
consumers is often impracticable because the amount of individual recovery would be insuf-
ficient to justify bringing a separate action; thus an unscrupulous seller retains the benefits of
its wrongful conduct. A class action by consumers produces several salutary byproducts,
including a therapeutic effect upon those sellers who indulge in fraudulent practices, aid to
legitimate business enterprises by curtailing illegitimate competition, and avoidance to the'
judicial process of the burden of multiple litigation involving identical claims. The benefit
to the parties and the courts would, in many circumstances, be substantial." See generall,
Barnoff, Lobell, Louisell, Miller, Warren & West, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court,
18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1041 (1971); Note, Judicial Protectionfor the Consumer: Vasquez v.
Superior Court, 23 HAsTINGS L.. 513 (1972).
42. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 965, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
43. Id at 969 & n.15, 971, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 382 & n.15, 384. The court noted, however,
that if individual damages were large, constitutionally effective notice could be required to
protect the integrity of the class action judgment. Id at 973, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 385; see also
Cooper v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 274, 127 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1976).
44. Several of the other sources of California class action procedures, see note 36 supra,
also do not require individual notice. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(c)(3) (West 1973); SUPE-
RIOR COURT MANUAL FOR CoNDUcr OF PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN CLASs ACTIONS § 427,
6, at 113 (1974).
45. For example, in the Eisen litigation the cost of mailing individual notice was esti-
mated to be $315,000 using the 1974 postal rate of 104. 417 U.S. at 167. In Cartt, the
estimated mailing cost was $68,718, also in 1974 postal rates. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 965, 124
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trust action involving a widely used consumer commodity, every
household in the state is an identifiable class member and must receive
individual notice. Even when the action involves a less widely distrib-
uted commodity, such as a consumer appliance, the defendant's war-
ranty records may provide an extensive list of names and addresses of
class members to whom individual notice may be required.
Traditionally, such prejudgment costs are borne by the plaintiff.
46
However, requiring the named plaintiffs in a large class action suit to
advance substantial sums of money to provide notice when their indi-
vidual injuries are small may prevent the lawsuit from proceeding. In
many instances, the cost of individual notice would offset a large por-
tion of the potential recovery. 47 Even when the identifiable plaintiffs
are not numerous, a plaintiff who has a small individual injury may be
reluctant to finance the notice to all similarly situated class members.
Requiring individual notice and insulating defendants from the cost
often may discourage large consumer class actions involving relatively
small individual recoveries. Therefore, named plaintiffs in consumer
classes have suggested that defendants be ordered to bear all or a por-
tion of the cost of giving preliminary notice to the unnamed class
members.
Federal law
In Eisen IV, the United States Supreme Court unequivocally held
that a trial court could not order defendants to bear any part of the cost
of preliminary notice to the plaintiff class.48 The Court reasoned that
Rule 23 provided the entire authority for class actions in the federal
courts.49 Nothing in Rule 23, however, authorized such cost shifting;
therefore, the costs could not be shifted.50
California law
The California Supreme Court, in Civil Service Employees Liability
Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,51 held that a trial court has discretion
to order a defendant in a class action suit to bear all or part of the costs
Cal. Rptr. at 379; see also Cosgrove v. First Merchants Nat'l Bank, 68 F.R.D. 555, 560-61
(E.D. Va. 1975) ("small recoveries in issue will be largely eliminated by the administrative
costs of the suit"); Considine v. Park Nat'l Bank, 64 F.RD. 646, 648 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) (cost
of notice "could be economically prohibitive when compared to the potential recovery").
46. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 178.
47. See In re Motel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1974) (court estimates
that recovery would be "entirely consumed by the costs of notice alone").
48. 417 U.S. at 177.
49. Id.
50. Id at 177-79.
51. 22 Cal. 3d 362, 584 P.2d 497, 149 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1978).
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of initial notice of the suit.5 2 The court centered its analysis on Califor-
nia's policy favoring consumer class actions.53 The cost-shifting proce-
dure, the court reasoned, permits consumer class actions to be decided
on their merits and therefore is "neither arbitrary nor irrational and
thus does not abridge substantive due process guarantees. '54 The de-
fendant argued that ordering it to pay the costs of notice without a final
judgment violated procedural due process. Noting that the trial court
had held a hearing in which it considered the likelihood that the plain-
tiff would prevail, the Supreme Court concluded that the hearing was
sufficient to protect the defendant's procedural due process rights.55
A second approach to the cost-shifting issue was suggested in Cart
v. Superior Court.5 6 The court was reluctant to burden the trial court
with extensive evidentiary presentations in pretrial hearings. The court
suggested that, to survive a due process challenge, a court must hold
some type of adversary hearing before ordering a defendant to pay the
costs of notice. A mini-hearing was suggested as the appropriate proce-
dure.5 7 The court sanctioned notice that was arguably less extensive
than that which would be required to make the final judgment legally
binding upon unnamed plaintiff class members.58 The court com-
mented, however, that if the defendant was "sincerely troubled about
the res judicata effect of this litigation," it should be allowed to finance
notice that would provide a legally binding judgment.5 9 The court,
therefore, shifted to the defendant the decision to finance more com-
plete notice. The defendant could accept the court of appeal's sugges-
52. Id at 376, 584 P.2d at 506, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 369; see also Roth v. Department of
Veteran Affairs, 110 Cal. App. 3d 622, 167 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980) (shifting a portion of notice
costs). Both the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(d), and the SUPE-
RIOR COURT MANUAL FOR CONDUCT OF PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN CLASS ACTIONS § 427,
6, at 113 (1974), permit cost-shifting.
53. 22 Cal. 3d at 376, 584 P.2d at 505, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
54. Id at 378, 584 P.2d at 506, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
55. Id at 380, 584 P.2d at 508, 149 Cal. Rpr. at 371. Justice Clark, dissenting, argued
that the cost-allocation order abridged the defendant's right to procedural due process. Id
at 382, 584 P.2d at 509, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 372. Justice Clark reasoned that the nature and
scope of the requisite hearing was insufficient to balance the respective interests. Id at 383,
584 P.2d at 510, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Justice Clark suggested that the defendant would not
recover the advanced costs even if he or she prevailed on the merits, because the named
plaintiff was admittedly unable to bear such costs. Id at 382, 584 P.2d at 509, 149 Cal. Rptr.
at 372. He noted that "It]he traditional method of financing class litigation involving minor
claims of many plaintiffs... is for counsel to advance the costs." Id at 386, 584 P.2d at
512, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 375. After balancing the respective interests, Justice Clark rejected the
majority's decision that a pretrial hearing to determine the probable outcome of the action
was sufficient to protect the defendant's right to procedural due process. Id at 384-85, 584
P.2d at 510, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
56. 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975).
57. Id at 975, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
58. See notes 38-44 & accompanying text .upra.
59. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 974, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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tion that notice financed by the plaintiff would be binding for practical
purposes upon absent class members. If the defendant rejected this
supposition, it could finance any further notice it believed would make
the judgment legally binding.
Fluid Recovery
To maintain a class action suit, the class must be certified. 60 An
important threshold certification issue is the manageability of the pro-
posed class. To determine liability, the theory of liability and the
means of proving and distributing damages must be capable of being
established so that the rights of unnamed class members will be fairly
adjudicated.61 Manageability requires that damages can be efficiently
distributed to a large class whose members have small individual
damages.
A primary device for distributing damages to such classes is the
fluid recovery, a device that enables the class members' damages to be
proven and distributed without resorting to individual proof of
claims.62 Fluid recovery simplifies the task of computing and distribut-
ing the damages of a large consumer class.63 Damages are computed
on the basis of the defendant's total sales to members of the class,
thereby precluding the need for each plaintiff to prove and collect his
or her individual damages. Damages usually can be computed on the
basis of the defendant's records. The total damages of the class consti-
tute a fund out of which two payments usually are made. The first
distribution from the fund is made to members of the class who come
forward with proof of their individual injuries. If individual damages
are small, this first payment probably will not distribute the entire fund
because not all individuals will make the effort to collect. A second
distribution is then made to reach, in a rough fashion, members of the
class who have not come forward. The most popular means of the sec-
ond distribution is through the relevant market for the product in-
volved in the lawsuit. For example, a second distribution may be
effected by offering a discount on the commodity that had been over-
priced in an antitrust violation. 64 Another means of the second distri-
bution may be to give the fund to a charity or a government agency to
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 23, 39
F.R.D. 98, 102-04 (1966).
62. See generally 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4600 (1977); Grossman, Class Ac-
dons: Manageability and the Fluid Recovery Doctrine, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 415 (1972).
63. See generally Grossman, Class Actions: Manageability and the Fluid Recovery Doc-
trine, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 415 (1972); Note, An EconomicAnalysis ofFluid Class Recovery Mech-
anisms, 34 STAN. L. REv. 173 (1981).
64. See generally Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39
U. CHI. L. REV. 448, 458-63 (1972).
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use the money to benefit members of the class.65
Fluid recovery is an important device in consumer class action
suits because it obviates the need for each consumer to come forward
and prove damages. By focusing on the defendant's unlawful gains,
fluid recovery ensures full disgorgement of wrongful gains. Further-
more, by allowing flexibility in the distribution of damages, consumers
who had minimal individual damages and did not claim their shares of
the award might receive some benefit through a second distribution.
The issue of fluid recovery usually arises during the certification of
the proposed class.66 Because manageability of the proposed class is
critical in both the federal and California class certification processes,
the availability of fluid recovery may determine whether the action will
proceed. If fluid recovery is not available, a consumer class might not
be manageable, and therefore not certifiable, because proof of individ-
ual damages would consume an inordinate amount of court time and
absent class members would not share in the damage recovery.
67
Federal law
Federal courts have used fluid recovery to distribute nonies paid
as settlements in class action suits6s and to distribute aggregate dam-
ages paid pursuant to a final judgment in a non-class action suit.69 The
use of fluid recovery to compute and distribute damages in class action
suits, however, is disapproved by many of the federal circuit courts. 70
The leading case criticizing fluid recovery is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin (Eisen 111).71 According to the Second Circuit in Eisen 11I,
fluid recovery was not only outside the scope of Rule 23, but also vio-
lated due process. 72 Because fluid recovery was outside the scope of
65. See id at 453-58.
66. See, e.g., Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977).
67. See id at 72. But cf In re Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 103 (N.D. Cal.
1973) (class certified without fluid recovery).
68. See, eg., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
afd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
69. See Bebchick v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203-04 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
70. See, ag., Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977); In re
Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479
F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
71. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156
(1974). In reviewing Eisen 111, the Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on the fluid
recovery issue. 417 U.S. at 172 n.10.
72. 479 F.2d at 1018. The Court did not analyze its declaration that fluid recovery
would violate due process. It is unlikely that the defendant has a due process right to con-
front each class member if damages can be proven in some other trustworthy fashion. See
McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protectiox Concepts andRealities in Procedure and Sub-
stance--Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGS L. 1351, 1403 (1974). While an absent plaintiff
could be deprived of due process if he or she received no benefit from a suit maintained in
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Rule 23, the court held that it could not be relied upon to make the
class manageable. 73 As fluid recovery was unavailable, proof of indi-
vidual injury and individual claims was required, but the Eisen III
court found it impossible to provide such proof and therefore found the
class unmanageable. 74
California law
In Bruno v. Superior Court,75 the California Court of Appeal re-
cently held that a fluid recovery could be used to distribute damages in
a Cartwright Act suit. The court determined that the decision whether
to use a fluid recovery should be made by the trial court on a case by
case basis, 76 but that nothing in California's class action procedure or
antitrust law barred its use in every case.77 According to Bruno, "[t]he
his or her right, due process violations may form the basis of a collateral attack. If a plaintiff
successfully attacks a class action judgment on due process grounds, the judgment will not
be binding. See note 26 supra.
73. 479 F.2d at 1018.
74. Id at 1016-18. The Ninth Circuit has followed Eisen III in refusing to certify
classes that rely on fluid recovery to show manageability. See In re Hotel Telephone
Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
75. 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1981).
76. Id at 135, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 350. The issue was presented to the court after the trial
court granted a motion to strike a prayer for a fluid distribution. Id. at 123, 179 Cal. Rptr. at
343. The court granted a writ of mandate vacating the order striking the prayer and directed
the trial court to consider the propriety of fluid class recovery under the facts of the particu-
lar case. Id. at 135, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51.
77. Id at 134-35, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 350. The court had to reconcile Blue Chip Stamps
v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 381, 386-87, 556 P.2d 755, 759, 134 Cal. Rptr. 393, 397 (1976),
in which the California Supreme Court overruled a class certification in which the trial court
partially relied on the availability of a fluid recovery to find the class was manageable. The
Bruno court explained that Blue Chio Stamps merely held that fluid recovery was not proper
under the facts of that case "because it would not have had any constructive effect-neither
disgorging any illegal profit ...nor compensating the injured class members." 127 Cal.
App. 3d at 125, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 344. Neither disgorgement nor compensation could be
served in Blue Cho Stamps because the alleged damages fund was in the possession of the
state and there was little correlation between the class of persons injured and the class that
would benefit from the proposed fluid recovery. Id. Blue Chp Stamps has not had a signifi-
cant impact on California class action procedure, and is probably limited to its peculiar
facts. See Hogya v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 122, 134-35, 142 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333-34
(1977) (overturning denial of certification of consumer class that relied on Blue Chp
Stamps); Bacon v. County of Merced, 68 Cal. App. 3d 45, 48-49, 136 Cal. Rptr. 14, 16-17
(1977) (applying Blue Chio Stamps in a case in which fund was already in the possession of
government agencies). See generally The Supreme Court of California 1976-1977, 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 138, 215-33 (1978) (criticizing Blue Chip Stamps, arguing that its restrictive ap-
proach should be read as dicta with no significant precedential value). Bruno concluded that
fluid recovery was consistent with the policy underlying California class actions, which is to
adopt innovative procedures to insure that defendants who injure large numbers of persons




issue is whether a fluid recovery will sufficiently further [the purposes
of the law under which the action is brought] given the facts of the
particular case under consideration. 78 Finding that a fluid recovery
could ensure that a defendant would be deterred from future wrong-
doing,79 and that injured plaintiffs could recover some compensation
under the proper facts,8 0 the Bruno court held that a fluid recovery
could be consistent with the substantive policies of the California class
action and antitrust laws.81
Challenges to a State Court Action
Removal
The differences between California and federal antitrust law and
class action procedures have encouraged consumer plaintiffs to file an-
titrust suits in California courts. These same differences have led de-
fendants to attempt to force plaintiffs to litigate their claims in federal
court. The removal procedures allow a defendant in state court under
certain circumstances to force a lawsuit to be transferred from state
court to federal court even against the wishes of the plaintiff.82 As re-
moval to federal court offers several advantages for the antitrust de-
fendant, so the device has often been used.
83
78. 127 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 347. Bruno followed the reasoning of
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981), which held that "[t]he general inquiry is whether
the use of such a mechanism is consistent with the policy or policies reflected by the statute
violated." Id at 676. Thus, the Bruno court identified the important Cartwright Act policies
of deterrence and punishment of unlawful acts, at 132, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49, and com-
pensation of the injured, id at 132-33, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 349, which could be accomplished
by a fluid recovery in the proper circumstances. Id. The Bruno court refused to accept the
argument that the policy of compensating the injured required that damages be distributed
"only to those who suffered injury and only in the amount that each person was injured."
d at 132, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (emphasis in original). All that was required was that there
be a "significant correlation between the injured class and the class to be benefited by the
distribution of damages." Id at 132, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
79. Id at 132, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
80. Id at 132-33, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
81. See note 77 supra. The court analyzed the Cartwright Act and concluded that fluid
recovery would be proper to distribute damages awarded under it. Id at 130-35, 179 Cal.
Rptr. at 347-50. Although the court found that "[a] recovery of damages by someone who
has not sustained damages is clearly contrary to the Cartwright Act," id at 130, 179 Cal.
Rptr. at 348, the court distinguished the recovery of damages from the distribution of dam-
ages. Under a fluid recovery, the damages are recovered by the class as soon as the judg-
ment is entered in its favor. The fact that the damages may be distributed to some non-class
members through a subsequent fluid mechanism would not, the court decided, be contrary
to the Act. Id at 131, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 348. Finally, the two goals of antitrust enforcement
and compensation could be furthered by fluid recovery, so that the court concluded it was a
viable mechanism for Cartwright Act class actions.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976).
83. Each of the California state actions listed in note 2 supra was removed. Each case
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A class action in federal court must meet the strict requirements of
Rule 23 whether the class relies on a federal or state theory of relief.
84
Therefore, a consumer suit that could be maintained in California
court may be dismissed if removed to federal court. If indirect pur-
chasers are forced to litigate claims for antitrust damages under federal
law in federal court, their claims will be dismissed because the indirect
purchaser ordinarily cannot recover damages under federal antitrust
laws.8
5
Antitrust defendants also may seek removal to consolidate litiga-
tion and to avoid the burden of defending multiple suits. Plaintiffs fre-
quently have fled actions in California courts concerning the same
basic issues being litigated concurrently in federal courts. 86 Multiple
actions also may have been filed in federal district courts throughout
the country, but such federal litigation usually is consolidated under
federal law, 7 thereby reducing the burdens on defendants in preparing,
settling, or litigating the cases. There is no corresponding procedure by
which actions in a state court can be consolidated with a federal ac-
tion.88 Hence, if similar actions are brought in state and federal courts,
a defendant must defend in several forums if it is unable to remove
state cases to the federal court.
Generally, an action is removable to federal court if the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction of the action filed
in the state court.8 9 The defendant makes a motion to remove an ac-
tion by filing a notice that states the grounds for removal in the appro-
priate federal district court and the case is removed automatically to
federal court. 90 The plaintiff then may move the federal court to re-
mand the case on the grounds that it was improvidently removed. 9'
was remanded except Gayer v. Cuisinarts, Inc., No. 458970 (Super. Ct. San Diego County,
Cal., filed Sept. 23, 1980).
84. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all civil actions removed to the
federal district courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 81(c). Although meeting Rule 23's strict standards
may be outcome determinative, and thus arguably substantive and controlled by state law,
see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the federal rules are by definition
procedural and not substantive, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976), and therefore will control actions
in federal court. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
85. See notes 6-21 & accompanying text supra.
86. See note 3 supra.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) permits the transfer to a single forum of actions filed in any
federal district court. See generally Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict
Litigation, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1001 (1974). The federal cases listed in note 3 supra have been
consolidated under § 1407.
88. There is, however, a procedure provided under California law for coordinating ac-
tions filed in separate California state courts. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 404-404.8 (West
1973 & Supp. 1981).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976).
90. Id § 1446.
91. Id § 1447.
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The burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the required federal
jurisdiction exists.92 Although antitrust defendants occasionally have
attempted to use diversity jurisdiction93 as grounds for removal,94 a pri-




A plaintiff's claim presents a federal question, and is therefore re-
movable, if the matter in controversy "arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."'96 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the phrase "arising under" to mean that "a right or immunity
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an
element, and an essential one, of the plaintiffs cause of action."'97 Such
a federally created right or immunity is "essential" to the plaintiffs re-
lief only if the plaintiffs claim "will be supported if the Constitution or
laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and de-
feated if they received another."98
92. See P.P. Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F.2d 546
(7th Cir. 1968).
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
Jurisdiction based on diversity requires that the citizenship of opposing parties be di-
verse, id § 1332(a), and that there be an amount in controversy greater than ten thousand
dollars. Id The plaintiff may forestall removal based on diversity by pleading the existence
of fictitious defendants whose citizenship destroys complete diversity. See Goldberg v. CPC
Int'l, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1980). A real defendant must be joined at some
point, however, or the action may be removed. See Preaseau v. Prudential Ins. Co., 591
F.2d 74, 76-79 (9th Cir. 1979). Even if there is diversity of citizenship, the amount in contro-
versy requirement is problematic in the context of consumer class actions. Although aggre-
gate damages may be large, individual damages are likely to be small. The individual
damages may not be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional requirement, Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332 (1969), and class members who do not have the required amount in contro-
versy may not "piggyback" on the claims of class members who do have it. Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300-02 (1973). Therefore, it would seem that the
requirement cannot be met in consumer class actions. Nonetheless, the district courts have
split on the issue of whether the statutory award of attorneys' fees to the named plaintiff may
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Compare In re Wiring Device Antitrust Liti-
gation, 498 F. Supp. 79, 81-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) with Rosack v. Volvo of America Corp., 421
F. Supp. 933, 937 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Although the federal court would apply state substan-
tive law in a case removed on diversity grounds, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
the federal court would apply the federal class action procedures to the possible detriment of
a consumer class. See note 84 & accompanying text supra.
94. See In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp. 79, 81-82 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
95. Removal on grounds of diversity presents a number of factual issues that are pecu-
liar to individual cases. Therefore, this Comment discusses only the issues surrounding re-
moval on federal question grounds.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
97. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936).
98. Id
CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST ACTIONSJanuary 1982]
The analysis of whether a federal question exists therefore focuses
on the basis of the plaintiffs claim for relief. Courts generally have
limited that scope of inquiry into the basis of the claim to an examina-
tion of the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint.99 Inquiry is limited
because "the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he
will rely upon, and therefore does determine whether he will bring a
'suit arising under' the. . . law of the United States. . . ."00 Thus,
traditionally, the plaintiff determines whether the action arises under
federal law by pleading the legal basis of recovery in the complaint.
In some cases, however, federal courts have refused to limit this
inquiry to an examination of the legal basis of a plaintiff's complaint. '0'
These courts have sought to determine whether the real nature of the
claim is federal, regardless of a plaintiff's characterization.102 This pro-
cess of "looking behind" a plaintiff's avowed reliance on state law
seems to conflict with the traditional view that a plaintiff "is master to
decide what law he will rely upon."' 0 3
Courts that have sought to determine whether a claim is "federal
in nature," however, normally have done so only when the defendant
shows that the state law the plaintiff has pled cannot support the plain-
tiffs recovery.l°4 Usually, courts have reached this conclusion because
the state law relied upon is preempted by federal law.'0 5 In some in-
stances, the courts have recharacterized a plaintiff's claims as federal
when the state law relied upon by the plaintiff could not support a re-
covery based on the allegations of the complaint. 10 6 Recently, how-
99. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1974) (Vercuriam)
(citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936)).
100. The Fair v. Kohler Die and Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
101. See, e.g., Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, 611 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981); In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp.
79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Three J Farms v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,
423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
911 (1980); Beech-Nut Inc. v. Warner Lambert Co., 346 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Ulichny v. General Electric Co., 309 F. Supp. 437 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Prospect Dairy, Inc. v.
Dellwood Dairy Co., 237 F. Supp. 176 (N.D.N.Y. 1964). See also cases cited in 14 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722, at 566
n.37 (1976).
102. The doctrinal basis of this practice by some federal courts is not clear. Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper have suggested that the courts "will not permit plaintiff to use
artful pleading to close off defendant's right to a federal forum." 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722, at 565-66 (1976).
103. The Fair v. Kohler Die and Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
104. See 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3722, at 363-69 (1976).
105. See, e.g., American Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 422 F.2d
462 (6th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. England, 356 F,2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961
(1966).
106. See, e.g., Three J Farms v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
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ever, in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie,10 7 the United States
Supreme Court, in a situation in which the state law may have sup-
ported recovery, seemed to approve a district court's refusal to remand
because the plaintiff's claim was federal in nature.
Federated Department Stores v. Moitie
In Federated Department Stores, the Court ruled that an action
filed in California state court by direct purchasers relying upon Califor-
nia common law was properly removed to the federal court.'0 8 The
Court found that "at least some of the claims had a sufficient Federal
character to support removal" and refused to question the district
court's "factual" finding that the plaintiffs "had attempted to avoid re-
moval jurisdiction by 'artfully' casting their 'essentially federal law
claims' as state-law claims."'
9
The Court's removal holding was incidental to the more important
resjudicata issue in the case, which grew out of the complex procedural
posture. This holding, however, was a necessary jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's res judi-
cata exception.' 10
The underlying claim involved price fixing of clothing by defend-
ant retail stores; the plaintiffs were direct-purchaser consumers."' Of
the seven actions originally filed, the same attorney instituted two ac-
tions-Moitie's action in California state court and Brown's action in
federal court.1 2 Moitie's action was removed to federal court, but this
removal was not challenged and played no part in the Court's deci-
sion." 3 When Moitie's action was removed, all seven actions were then
in federal court, and all were dismissed on the grounds that plaintiff
consumers could not recover under the federal antitrust laws because
they were not "injured in their business or profession" within the
meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 1 4 The plaintiffs in five of the
actions appealed, but neither Moitie nor Brown appealed this adverse
decision and their judgments of dismissal were therefore final.115
62,423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.s. 911 (1980).
107. 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981).
108. Id at 2427 n.2.
109. Id
110. If there had been no proper jurisdiction upon removal, the case should have been
remanded to state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1976), without reaching the res judicata issue.
11I. 101 S. Ct. at2426.
112. Id
113. Seeid
114. Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, 426 F. Supp. 880, 883-85 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(construing 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)), rev'dmem., 608 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1979).
115. See 101 S. Ct. at 2426.
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Plaintiffs Moitie and Brown then filed suits in California state court.'1 6
Defendants removed both actions and Moitie and Brown both moved
to remand the actions to state court.
1 7
The district court refused to remand, finding that the plaintiffs had
an "essentially federal law claim" and that they therefore could not
"defeat removal by employing artful pleading to cast [their] claim...
in terms of state law.""" The district court then dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claims on the grounds that the unappealed dismissal of their origi-
nal action was res judicata and barred the present action." 9
The Ninth Circuit approved the district court's resolution of the
removal issue without citation to authority, by summarily concluding
that the plaintiffs' claims were federal: "The court below correctly held
that the claims presented were federal in nature, arising solely from
price fixing on defendants' part. In light of our disposition of this ap-
peal, appellants will not quarrel with the result."' 20 The Ninth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs' claims were not barred by res judicata by fash-
ioning an exception to the traditional res judicata rule.' 2'
The Supreme Court was concerned primarily with the res judicata
issue and followed the Ninth Circuit's summary disposition of the re-
mand issue.' 22 The Court's disposition of the remand issue presents
several questions concerning the operation of the removal procedure.
First, recharacterizing the plaintiffs' complaint to allow removal appar-
ently is contrary to traditional remand procedure, which limits scrutiny
to the face of the complaint. 23 Second, by characterizing as "factual"
116. This state court filing was Moitie's second and Brown's first. Moitie's first suit in
state court had been removed, consolidated, and dismissed. Removal was not questioned in
the first state court action. Id
117. See Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, 611 F.2d 1267, 1268 (9th Cir. 1980).
118. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, No. C-77-0576, slip. op. at 5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 6,
1977). The single authority cited for this holding was a case concerning preemption. New
York v. Local 1115 Joint Board, Nursing Home and Hospital Employees Div., 412 F. Supp.
720 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). This case actually rejected the defendant's argument that the state law
basis for the plaintif's claim was preempted. Id at 723. The court reasoned that it would be
"illogical to say that the litigant's claim is really predicated on a body of law which grants
him no rights." Id Even if the state law was preempted, the court noted that it "should be
decided as a matter of defense in the State courts in the first instance .. d.." I  at 724.
119. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, No. C-77-0576, slip. op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. July 6,
1977).
120. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, 611 F.2d 1267, 1268 (9th Cir. 1980). The parties
apparently considered the removal issue to be the crucial one in the appeal because they
"devoted their briefs and oral arguments to the removal issue." Id at 1268 n.2. The parties
did not brief the res judicata issue, which was the primary interest of the court of appeals.
Id
121. Id at 1269-70.
122. The Supreme Court discussed the removal issue in a single footnote. See 101 S. Ct.
at 2427 n.2.
123. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, 415 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1974) (per curiam)
(citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936)).
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the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs' claims were federal in na-
ture, the Court has departed from normal practice. Usually, judicial
scrutiny is limited to matters appearing on the face of the plaintiffs
complaint. The "factual" approach will encourage inconsistent results
by apparently limiting the scope of appellate review. 124 Third, by ac-
cepting jurisdiction on the grounds that the state complaint actually
pled a Sherman Act claim, the federal courts should have dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction under the doctrine of derivative jurisdic-
tion.125 This approach was overlooked by the Supreme Court in Feder-
ated Department Stores.1
26
Reconciling Federated Department Stores
with Removal Procedures
The question whether a plaintiffs claim presents a federal ques-
tion generally has been resolved by asking whether it is apparent from
124. The difficulty presented by Federated Department Stores was demonstrated by the
contrasting treatment of suits that were arguably by direct purchasers in the Northern and
Southern Districts of California. In a consumer class action suit alleging vertical price
fixing, Judge Patel of the Northern District relied on Washington v. American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1972) (derivative jurisdiction doctrine
compelled remand), to order remand. See Louie v. Cuisinarts, Inc., No. C-80-3929 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 5, 1980). Judge Thompson of the Southern District relied on the Ninth Circuit
decision, Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, 611 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1980), to deny a motion
to remand in a parallel case. See Gayer v. Cuisinarts, Inc., No. 80-1675 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27,
1981) (amended order denying motion to remand). Judge Thompson found that Baseball
"involved a situation manifestly different and distinguishable from the one presented at bar.
Rather, this case closely resembles the facts of the more recent decision denying remand in
the case of Moltie v. Federated Department Stores." Id at 2. Judge Thompson reasoned that
Motie controlled because the plaintiffs' alleged facts gave "rise to both federal and state
antitrust claims for relief." 1d Thus, Judge Thompson did not limit loltie to circum-
stances involving preemption or res judicata, see notes 151-53 & accompanying text ifra,
but rather applied it to a case in which the plaintiff admittedly did have a state law claim.
Furthermore, Judge Thompson suggested that derivative jurisdiction, see notes 145-48 &
accompanying text inMra, was not an issue in the case precisely because the plaintiff had both
a state and federal law claim. In his view, the federal claim that gave his court jurisdiction
had somehow arisen after the case was removed, and thus was not present in the state court.
125. See notes 145-48 & accompanying text Myira.
126. At least one other argument may be advanced to challenge removal of consumer
antitrust claims. The federal class action procedures may require dismissal of large con-
sumer classes if they are forced to litigate in the federal forum. See notes 24-85 & accompa-
nying text supra. Courts have recognized that it is illogical and improper to remove a case
when that removal will deprive the plaintiff of relief under either federal or state law. See In
re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978), discussedin text accompanying
notes 154-58 infa; New York v. Local 1115 Joint Board, Nursing Home and Hospital Em-
ployees Div., 412 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Therefore, it can be argued that removing a
class action that oannot be maintained in federal court is an improper use of removal. But
see In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (despite reli-
ance on state law, true nature of the complaint was federal; because indirect purchasers have
no right of action under federal antitrust laws, the action was dismissed).
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the complaint that the relief sought rests on an interpretation of federal
law. 127 Federated Department Stores approaches removal differently.
According to the district court's opinion, endorsed by the Supreme
Court, 12 8 the propriety of removal depends on whether the allegations
of fact in a plaintiff's complaint could have stated a federal legal
claim. 129 This approach, however, deprives the plaintiff of his or her
traditional power to choose a state or federal forum in which to bring
suit. If Federated Department Stores is construed broadly, whenever a
defendant can find a federal law or constitutional right that arguably
has been violated by the alleged actions in the plaintiff's complaint,
the plaintiff's entire claim may be removable on federal question
grounds. ' 3
0
It is difficult to ascertain from the Supreme Court's disposition of
Federated Department Stores the basis upon which the federal courts
should determine whether the plaintiff's claim is "federal in nature."
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court offered a test or iden-
tified factors that help determine the "federal nature" of the plaintiff's
claims. 131 The district court discussed the background of the claims
filed by Moitie and Brown in reaching its decision, showing a concern
with the plaintiffs' apparent attempt to evade the res judicata effect of
the prior judgments, which were rendered when neither Brown nor
Moitie contested the federal courts' jurisdiction.132 Each of these fac-
tual circumstances was discussed by the district court before it reached
its conclusion that a plaintiff could not engage in "artful pleading" to
defeat removal. 133 The Supreme Court cited the district court's "exten-
sive review and analysis of the origins and substance of the two Brown
complaints" in upholding the district court's result.' 34 This reliance on
127. See notes 96-107 & accompanying text supra.
128. 101 S. Ct. at 2427 n.2.
129. See notes 118-19 & accompanying text supra.
130. See Gayer v. Cuisinarts, Inc., No. 80-1675 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1981), discussed in
note 124 supra.
131. Justice Brennan dissented in Federated Department Stores and criticized the major-
ity's failure to provide a standard on which the lower courts could determine whether a
claim was "federal in nature": "I do not understand what the Court means by this. Which
of the claims are federal in character? Why are the claims federal in character?" 101 S. Ct.
at 2433 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan concluded that, absent an alleged reliance
by the plaintiffs on a federal remedy under the Clayton Act, "the mere fact that plaintiffs
might have chosen to proceed under the Clayton Act surely does not suffice to transmute
their state into federal claims." Id
132. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, No. C-77-0576, slip. op. at 5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 6,
1977).
133. Id
134. 101 S. Ct. at 2427 n.2. By the time of argument in the Supreme Court, Moitie had
dismissed his appeal. Id. at 2426 n. 1. Therefore, the remand at issue in the Supreme Court
case involved only Brown's action, which had been filed first in federal court, dismissed, and
then refied in state court. Id at 2426.
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the origins and substance of the two complaints filed by plaintiff
Brown-the first complaint filed in federal court relying on the Sher-
man Act, and the second complaint filed in state court relying on state
law-suggests that the Supreme Court found significant the plaintiff's
attempt to use "artful pleading" to evade the res judicata effect of a
federal judgment that had been rendered in a federal forum chosen by
the plaintiff.'
35
Until Federated Department Stores, the federal courts' concern
with the use of "artful pleading" to avoid removal generally had been
limited to cases in which the federal court found either that the state
law relied upon by the plaintiff was preempted by a federal law or that
the state law provided no relief, but federal law would do so.' 36 The
Supreme Court's reliance on the "artful pleading" doctrine to allow
135. In Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
the court attempted to reconcile Federated Department Stores with traditional removal law
by explaining that "artful pleading" is an exception when "plaintiff seeks to conceal the
federal nature of his claim by fraud or obfuscation." Id at 572. The court noted that the
well established application of "artful pleading" analysis involved preemption. Id at 574-
75. In the context of antitrust claims filed in state court, Salveson identified two situations in
which "artful pleading" might be found. The first is when state law provides no relief. Id
at 576-77. See note 136 infra. The second situation involves circumstances such as those in
FederatedDevLariment Stores, which the court explained as turning on Brown's prior consent
to federal jurisdiction by filing suit in federal court. This prior suit established the defend-
ants "right" to a federal forum. Id at 575. The court applied Federated Department Stores
to support removal in Salveson, because the plaintiff previously had filed a federal suit in-
volving the same subject matter, which had been dismissed with prejudice. Id at 577-78.
After refusing to remand on the authority of Federated Department Stores, the court dis-
missed the antitrust claims on the basis of derivative jurisdiction. It then retained jurisdic-
tion of the pendent common law causes of action and dismissed them by applying res
judicata. Id at 580-83. But cf. Bancohio Corp. v. Fox, 516 F.2d 29, 32 (6th Cir. 1975)
(refusing to take pendent jurisdiction over common law claims pled along with an action
that was barred by doctrine of derivative jurisdiction). Salveson limits Federated Department
Stores by allowing removal only when a plaintiff has previously filed suit in federal court.
Dicta, however, suggests that any plaintiffs who remain members of a federal antitrust class
have accepted the federal character of their antitrust claims. Id at 576. Thus, an indirect
purchaser's inclusion in a federal class of direct purchasers may act to provide a basis for
removal. Such reasoning could provide the basis for removal of indirect purchaser actions
when the class representatives also have made direct purchases and therefore are also mem-
bers of federal classes. This dicta has been advanced to support removal. See Memoran-
dum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Order on Motion to Remand, at 4-5,
Pate v. Boise Cascade Corp., No. C-81-2732 (N.D. Cal. fied Nov. 2, 1981).
136. See notes 104-06 & accompanying text supra. The cases cited by the Supreme
Court to support denial of remand in FederatedDepartment Stores on the ground of "artful
pleading" were three district court opinions in which the state law relied upon by the plain-
tiffs was either preempted by federal law, Prospect Dairy Co. v. Dellwood Dairy Co., 237 F.
Supp. 176 (N.D.N.Y. 1964), or did not allow recovery for the plaintiffs' cause of action. In
re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Three J Farms v.
Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423 (D.S.C. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980). Both Wiring Device
and Three JFarms involved applications of South Carolina's antitrust statute, which South
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removal in Federated Department Stores seems misplaced because the
Cartwright Act never has been held to be preempted 37 and the Court
did not suggest that it was preempted.
1 38
The "Federal-in-Nature" Requirement as a Factual Question
A second major question left unanswered by the Court's decision
Carolina courts had held inapplicable to alleged antitrust violations involving interstate
commerce. State v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 71 S.C. 544, 51 S.E. 455 (1905).
Several other states similarly limit their antitrust statutes. See, e.g., Kosuga v. Kelly,
257 F.2d 48, 55 (7th Cir. 1958), aidon other grounds, 358 U.S. 516 (1958) (construing Illi-
nois law); Cessna Finance Corp. v. White Industries, 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,105
(W.D. Mo. 1976) (construing Missouri law); Belton Elec. Corp. v. Selbst, 1977-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,586, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, 1977), afd mem., 61 App. Div. 2d 966, 403
N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1978) (New York); Young v. Seaway Pipeline, 576 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Okla.
1977) (Oklahoma). California, on the other hand, does not limit the application of its anti-
trust statutes to wholly intrastate activities. See Younger v. Jensen, 26 Cal. 3d 397, 405, 605
P.2d 813, 818, 161 Cal. Rptr. 905, 910 (1980); R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal.
App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
In cases in which state antitrust statutes do not provide a remedy, the doctrine of deriv-
ative jurisdiction would seem to compel the federal court to dismiss the action. See notes
145-48 & accompanying text infra. Furthermore, preemption is generally held to be an af-
firmative defense. See, e.g., Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 1972). The existence of an affirmative defense that gives
rise to a federal question will not support removal jurisdiction. Id.; see Pan American
Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656, 663 (1961); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299
U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville Ry. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Exparte Wisner, 203 U.S.
458 (1906). Thus, the soundness of allowing removal in the event of preempted state law is
doubtful.
137. See 101 S. Ct. at 2433 (Brennan, J., dissenting); R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors
Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974); Mosk, State Antitrust Enforcement and
Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REPORTS 358, 361-
68 (1962); cf. Connecticut v. Levi Strauss & Co., 471 F. Supp. 363 (D. Conn. 1979) (Connect-
icut antitrust statute not preempted). See generally J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE AN-
TITRUST REGULATION 56-108 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FLYNN]; Rubin, Rethinking State
Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 668-70 (1974); Note, The Commerce Clause
and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (1961). Although the Supreme
Court never has ruled directly on preemption of state antitrust laws, it has accepted state
antitrust regulation without direct preemption analysis. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234
U.S. 199 (1914); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912); Straus v. Ameri-
can Publisher's Ass'n, 321 U.S. 222 (1913); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307
(1911); Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910). For a discussion of preemption
arguments in the wake of Illinois Brick, see notes 159-206 & accompanying text infra.
138. Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that a plaintiff should not be allowed to
avoid federal jurisdiction when his or her state law claim had been preempted by federal
law, but noted that these circumstances were not present in Federated Department Stores
because the Cartwright Act had not been preempted. 101 S. Ct. at 2433 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Justice Brennan concluded that "[a]rtful or not, respondent's complaint was not




in Federated Department Stores is the effect of labeling as "factual" the
district court's finding that the plaintiffs' claims presented federal ques-
tions rather than a state claim. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opin-
ion, noted that the district court had treated its conclusion that the
plaintiff's claims were "federal in nature" as a legal conclusion. 139 He
further reasoned that, "[i]n any event, a court's conclusion concerning
the legal character of a complaint can hardly be considered a 'factualfinding.' -140
Calling this recharacterization of the plaintiff's complaint a factual
conclusion raises a number of questions.141 The Court's failure to ad-
dress the issues can only serve to inject further confusion into the re-
moval and remand procedure.142 As the amount of litigation brought
by indirect purchaser classes in the state courts is increasing, 43 and as
removal of such suits to federal court may well result in dismissal of
such claims for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23,144 the
courts should more clearly define the circumstances under which a
plaintiff's state law claim presents a federal question, making the claim
removable.
Derivative Jurisdiction
None of the opinions in the FederatedDepartment Stores litigation
discussed the application of the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. The
derivative jurisdiction doctrine requires that, upon removal of an ac-
tion to federal court, the court assumes jurisdiction only if the state
court had had jurisdiction of the action. 145 Accordingly, if an action is
filed in state court over which the state court does not have jurisdiction,
the action cannot be maintained in federal court upon removal because
the federal court takes the action subject to any jurisdictional infirmi-
ties that existed in the state court.
The decision in Federated Department Stores seems erroneous. If,
139. Id at 2433 n.5.
140. Id
141. These questions include: Does this open the remand hearing to evidence concern-
ing the true nature of the claim or is the hearing still limited to the face of the plaintiff's
complaint? Which facts are important in the determination of the nature of the claim? Does
the plaintiffs mere ability to state a cause of action under federal law support a finding that
a federal claim exists? Perhaps most importantly, is the scope of appellate review limited to
the strict scope usually applied to review of factual determinations?
142. See note 124 supra.
143. See note 3 supra.
144. See notes 84-85 & accompanying text supra.
145. "If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the fed-
eral court acquires none [upon removal], although it might in a like suit brought there have
had jurisdiction." Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922);
see also Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943); General Inv. Co. v. Lakeshore &
Michigan Southern Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 288 (1922).
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by stating that the action was "federal in nature,"' 146 the court meant
that it was a federal antitrust claim, then the state court did not have
original jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims is exclu-
sively federal, and state courts therefore have no jurisdiction over such
claims.1 47 Thus, it seems that, if the plaintiffs' claims in Federated De-
partment Stores are found to be based on the Sherman Act, and the
state courts have no jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims, the federal
court would have no jurisdiction over the claims once they were re-
moved to the federal court. In light of the principles of derivative juris-
diction, it would seem that Federated Department Stores either should
have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or remanded to the state
courts. 
148
If the Supreme Court allows the federal courts to characterize
plaintiffs' state law claims as Sherman Act claims, thereby allowing re-
moval, and applies derivative jurisdiction, direct purchaser plaintiffs
may be left with no remedy under the state antitrust laws. In short, if a
direct purchaser files an antitrust claim in state court, the claim may be
removed to federal court and dismissed. Only if a plaintiff files in fed-
eral court can he or she be guaranteed of maintaining an antitrust ac-
tion, but then the consumer class may not be certifiable or otherwise
maintainable because of the strict requirements of Rule 23.
Limiting Federated Department Stores
This apparent deprivation of the plaintiff's right to choose a state
146. 101 S. Ct. at 2427 n.2.
147. See Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436,
440 (1920); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
148. In Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654
(9th Cir. 1972), the court applied the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction to support its remand
of an antitrust case that defendants contended was "federal in nature." In Baseball, the
court refused to take a position on "looking behind" the plaintiffs alleged reliance on state
law. I.d at 658. The court found that, even if it properly could recharacterize the plaintiffs
complaint, the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction would require it to dismiss any cause of
action that it found was a "disguised" federal antitrust claim. Id Remaining state claims
should be remanded because the federal court was not "allowed to proceed with the federal
claims giving rise to its removal jurisdiction." Id at 659. The state and federal claims were
inexorably intertwined-the only practical way to remand them was "to remand the whole
action." Id If any claim was truly a federal antitrust cause of action, the state court would
be required to dismiss it. The court refused to entertain preemption analysis because it was
a state-court defense. Id; see also Hughes Const. Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 487 F. Supp. 345,
347 n.3 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (applying doctrine of derivative jurisdiction against removal of
state antitrust action on federal question grounds). In Salveson v. Western States Bankcard
Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1981), the court did apply derivative jurisdiction after
determining that the state law claim was a federal antitrust claim, and dismissed the claim.
Id. at 578-80. The court was able to reach the same result as the Supreme Court in Feder-
ated Department Stores because it retained jurisdiction over all other claims in the plaintiffs
complaint and dismissed them under the doctrine of res judicata. Id at 580-83.
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forum when he or she has available a viable state remedy would be a
serious usurpation of remedies traditionally afforded to plaintiffs. As
noted by Justice Brennan, dissenting in Federated Department Stores,
the remand procedures are "well grounded in principles of federal-
ism. 1 49 According to Justice Brennan, the basic power retained by the
states to regulate concurrently absent federal preemption should be
maintained to prevent doing "violence to state autonomy."1 50 As long
as the state law relied upon is not preempted, the federal court's defer-
ence to the state court's duty to enforce state laws argues for remand of
a plaintiffs state law antitrust claims.
The federalism argument is even stronger when analyzed in light
of the outcome determinative nature of removal to federal court for
many consumer class action suits. Not only does the danger exist that
the federal court will unduly encroach on the autonomy of state courts,
but a greater threat of injustice is present because a federal court ac-
cepting jurisdiction over a direct purchaser class action after removal
may be forced by the strict requirements of Rule 23 to dismiss the ac-
tion. Thus, it would be unfair to the class of direct purchasers for the
federal court to take jurisdiction over a claim that it is unable to admin-
ister. To allow removal on the grounds that a federal question could
have been stated by plaintiffs and then to dismiss the action for failure
to meet federal class action criteria would infringe on traditional auton-
omy of the state courts.
Allowing the lower courts to make an unguided factual determina-
tion that Cartwright Act claims are "federal in nature" invites inconsis-
tent results, and could affect the right of direct purchasers to sue in
California state courts.15 ' Therefore, courts should narrowly apply
Federated Department Stores and limit its application to its facts. The
case may best be understood as a specific aspect of "looking behind" a
plaintiff's state law claims when the claims are preempted. A federal
court may overlook the plaintiffs express reliance on state law in deter-mining that the claim really presents a federal question, if state law
provides no relief. In Federated-Department Stores, the court seemed to
extend this preemption exception to cases in which plaintiffs have no
viable state law claim because they previously have received an adverse
judgment with potential res judicata effect in a suit that they filed previ-
ously in federal court. The effect of the finding that res judicata bars
relitigation of plaintiffs' claims in state court is similar to a decision that
state law is preempted. The state law relied upon cannot apply to
plaintiffs' claims, because of either the conclusive operation of a federal
law or a federal judicial determination in a suit that the plaintiffs initi-
149. 101 S. Ct. at 2432.
150. Id
151. See note 124supra.
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ated.152 In both instances, the plaintiffs do not have a viable state
claim. Using the possibility of a res judicata effect to assert jurisdiction
upon removal, however, leaves many issues unaddressed. 53 Nonethe-
less, Federated Department Stores could be limited to allowing removal
only when the same plaintiffs have previously filed an action in federal
court, which has been dismissed by a judgment with res judicata effect.
Without such a limiting interpretation, the operation of the removal
procedure and derivative jurisdiction will have to be reexamined and
reconciled with Federated Department Stores. This case should not be
construed to allow a defendant to remove a state antitrust action to
federal court merely because the plaintiff could have asserted a federal
claim.
Indirect Purchasers--Saved by Sugar
Although a broad application of Federated Department Stores may
result in the loss of the right of direct purchasers to sue in California
state courts, indirect purchasers can still pursue state court actions
under California antitrust laws. In In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation,
54
the Ninth Circuit held that an indirect purchasers' antitrust action must
be remanded to state court when the defendant seeks removal.
The court noted that Illinois Brick prevented indirect purchasers
from recovering under federal antitrust laws. 55 Without a basis for
relief under federal law, the court reasoned that there could be no fed-
eral action.-56 The court found itself "squarely faced with claims as-
serted under California antitrust laws on facts that do not state a
federal claim,"' 157 and did not reach the issue of whether it could prop-
erly "look behind" the plaintiff's reliance on state law. Sugar indicates
that, at least in the Ninth Circuit, 58 federal courts will not allow the
152. In Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
this new development in removal law was related to the principle that defects in the federal
court's removal jurisdiction are waivable. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's consent to
removal jurisdiction was manifested in Federated Department Stores by the plaintiff's prior
suit in federal court. Id at 575-76.
153. For example, a decision that the federal court has jurisdiction as a result of removal
on the basis of res judicata does not address the difficulties in the operation of the derivative
jurisdiction doctrine. See notes 145-48 & accompanying textsupra. In addition, assertion of
the defense of res judicata as a basis of federal jurisdiction is contrary to the principle that
affirmative defenses cannot supply federal question jurisdiction. See note 136 supra.
154. 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978).
155. Id. at 1273.
156. Id
157. Id at 1272.
158. Cf In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(removal on federal question and diversity grounds proper, action dismissed because Illinois
Brick precludes recovery by indirect purchasers).
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removal of actions brought by indirect purchasers under state antitrust
laws.
Multiple Penalties and Preemption of the Indirect Purchaser's
Cartwright Act Remedy
The prevailing interpretations of the Sherman Act and the Cart-
wright Act present the possibility that an antitrust defendant may be
required to pay overlapping treble damages to direct and indirect pur-
chasers in federal and state courts for the same anticompetitive acts.
Although no court has yet been presented with a case giving rise to animminent overlapping penalty, the penalty provisions of the two laws
may permit this possibility. Under the Sherman Act, the direct pur-
chaser is entitled to recover the entire overcharge attributable to an an-
titrust violation, even if that direct purchaser passed on the overcharge
to indirect purchasers. 159 Under the Cartwright Act, the indirect pur-
chaser is entitled to prove that he or she in fact suffered the overcharge
that the direct purchaser passed on and to recover those damages.
160
Thus, the indirect purchaser's recovery against an antitrust violator
under the Cartwright Act may constitute a portion of the overcharge
for which the direct purchaser recovered treble damages under the
Sherman Act.
The danger of multiple penalties is probably not present in paral-
lel class action suits filed by direct purchasers who bring suit in both
state court and federal court. 161 It is unlikely that a class of direct pur-
chaser consumers would be certified to litigate the claim in federal
court. 162 Even if such a consumer class was certified and litigated its
claim to final judgment, the final judgment should bar a subsequent
state action by an identical class of direct purchasers. Class action
judgments meeting due process requirements are binding on all mem-
bers of the class. 163 Furthermore, a final judgment is conclusive on all
claims actually litigated and all claims that could have been litigated
159. See notes 6-21 & accompanying text supra.
160. See note 22 & accompanying text supra. See generally Note, Indirect Purchaser
Suits Under State,4ntitrust Laws: A DetourAround the lllnoft Brick Wall, 34 STAN. L. REV.
203, 205-08 (1981).
161. Direct purchaser consumers often may choose to litigate antitrust claims in Califor-
nia courts because of the state court's more flexible class action procedures. If Federated
Department Stores is extended to permit removal of direct purchaser actions as it has been in
the Southern District of California, see note 124 supra, they will not have the choice to
proceed in state court.
162. See note 24-81 & accompanying text supra.
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3): Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 23, 39
F.R.D. 98, 105 (1966); see alro Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
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between the parties.1 64 Thus, a judgment in a class action suit filed in
federal court by a class of direct purchasers that included California
direct purchasers would be binding on any class of California direct
purchasers who subsequently filed suit in California court, because the
direct purchasers' Cartwright Act claim could have been brought in
federal court as pendent to the Sherman Act claim. 165
Res judicata, however, would not bar a subsequent suit in state
court by indirect purchasers. A class of direct purchasers that received
a federal court judgment probably would not have an identity of inter-
est with a class of indirect purchasers. Because res judicata cannot bar
an action by a plaintiff who has not had an opportunity to be heard in
court either individually or as a member of a class, 166 a judgment ob-
tained by a class of direct purchasers probably would not bar a subse-
164. See, e.g., Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1964); William-
son v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469-70 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 921 (1951); F.L. Mendez & Co. v. General Motors Corp., 161 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1947);
Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 676, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1973).
165. See Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 32-33 (8th Cir. 1964); Ford
Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 676, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1973). The rule that a
judgment is binding on all claims that could have.been raised gives rise to numerous issues
when plaintiffs may be both direct and indirect purchasers. There may be serious questions
about the binding effect of a judgment entered adjudicating indirect purchasers' rights in
federal court when their interests seriously conflict with the interests of direct purchasers. A
challenge to the adequacy of representation may form the basis of a collateral attack on the
prior class action judgment. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683
(1961); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d
1055 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class
Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REV. 589 (1974); Comment, The Importance ofBeing Ade-
quate. Due Process Requirements in Class Actions under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1217 (1975). In addition, some Cartwright Act claims arguably cannot be brought as pen-
dent claims in federal court and thus cannot be barred because they could have been liti-
gated together with direct purchaser claims in- federal court. Pendent jurisdiction may be
exercised by the federal courts when "state and federal claims. . . derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). A
Cartwright Act claim involving the same price-fixing conspiracy would seem to be a proper
pendent claim to a Sherman Act claim. The exercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary,
however, to be exercised within "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fair-
ness to litigants." Id at 726. The Illinois Brick decision essentially rested on a conclusion
that litigating indirect purchaser claims in federal court was contrary to federal judicial
economy. See notes 7-21 & accompanying text supra. Furthermore, the great possibility of
jury confusion in these antitrust claims weighs against the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. Finally, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction
could require the federal court to rule on issues of federal preemption of state law, a further
consideration weighing against the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Id Thus, the federal
courts arguably should refuse to exercise pendent jurisdiction over indirect purchaser Cart-
wright Act claims. It would be inequitable to bar such a claim in state court when it could
not have been brought in the federal action.
166. See Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd., 329 F. Supp. 966 (D. Wis. 1971);
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST ACTIONS
quent action by indirect purchasers. 167
Therefore, the problem of multiple penalties against the same anti-
trust defendant generally is limited to situations in which an antitrust
defendant may be compelled to pay damages to both direct and indi-
rect purchasers. The divergence between the two antitrust statutes re-
garding the indirect purchasers' remedy may constitute a conflict
between those laws that give rise to the possibility that the Cartwright
Act's indirect purchaser remedy is preempted by the Sherman Act. 168
Preemption
The doctrine of preemption holds that in certain instances state
laws are overridden by federal laws or regulations by operation of the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.1 69 Preemption
problems arise because state and federal legislatures possess concurrent
jurisdiction to.regulate many subjects.1 70 States retain the powers to
167. However, if a class member is both a direct and an indirect purchaser, other
problems may arise. See note 165 supra.
168. Commentators who, in the past, have argued that state antitrust statutes are not
preempted generally have reserved their conclusions if a multiple penalty was involved. See,
e.g., FLYNN, supra note 137, at 156-57; Barnett, Problems of Compliance-Conflicts in State
andFederalAntitrust Enforcement, 29 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 285, 285 n.2 (1965); Dillon, But
the Other Referee Said/-4 Criticism of Multrie Litigation in Identical Bidding and Merger
Cases, 39 TEx. L. REv. 782, 804-07 (1961); Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Pol-
icy, 39 Tax. L. Rav. 753, 757 (1961); Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U.
FLA. L. Rav. 653, 685 (1974). But see State v. Southeast Tex. Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Con-
tractor's Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (Department of Justice, as amici cu-
riae, argued that double prosecutions should not compel finding of preemption), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 969 (1963). Since the apparent contrast between California and federal law
in the wake of Illinois Brick, both the courts, see Connecticut v. Levi Strauss & Co., 471 F.
Supp. 363 (D. Conn. 1979), and commentators have raised the preemption issue. See gener-
ally Note, Indirect Purchaser Suites Under StateAntitrust Laws: A4 Detour 4round the Illinois
Brick Wall, 34 STAN. L. REv. 203, 211-18 (1981) (finding no preemption of an indirect
purchaser state law remedy after Illinois Brick).
The need to defend antitrust suits in both state and federal courts together with the
possibility that multiple penalties may be incurred also has given rise to an argument that
the Cartwright Act constitutes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. See Con-
necticut v. Levi Strauss & Co., 471 F. Supp. 363, 368 (D. Conn. 1979). The burden-on-
commerce argument is unpersuasive. In LeviStrauss, the court stressed that the "Commerce
Clause protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms," id at 368 (citing Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1981)), and stated, "uniformly ap-
plied prohibitions of price-fixing would not seem to inhibit the flow of goods between
states." Id
169. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376
(1978).
170. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728-29 (1949); R.E. Spriggs & Co. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 658, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1974); FLYNN, supra note 137,
at 56-108. See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 58 (1978); Rubin,
Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. Rav. 653, 667-73 (1974); Note, The
Commerce Clause andStateAntitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. Rav. 1469 (1961); Note, The
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regulate certain activities affecting interstate commerce that the federal
government also regulates under the commerce clause. 171 The federal
power, if exercised, can be plenary; Congress can expressly preempt
state laws that purport to regulate in an area regulated by the federal
law.172 A problem arises, however, when Congress does not explicitly
preempt state law, because the courts then must decide whether the
state law is implicitly preempted by federal. legislation. In general, the
courts inquire whether the state legislation conflicts with federal law to
such a degree that the state and federal laws cannot concurrently be
enforced without impairing the purpose and manner of federal
regulation.1
73
Whether a conflict sufficient to infer preemption exists between
state and federal regulation is analyzed on a case-by-case basis; a clear
test is difficult to elicit from the cases. 174 Deciding whether a state stat-
ute conflicts with a federal statute requires a two-step analysis. First,
the two statutes must be construed. 175 A federal court usually defers to
a state court's interpretation of the state law. 176 After construing the
two statutes, the court ascertains whether the state law interferes with
the federal law or the furtherance of important federal policies.' 77 The
finding of such an interference or conflict is "disfavored" because
under the federalist system states may regulate to further state inter-
ests.178 The Supreme Court has indicated that conflicts must be real
and concrete, not hypothetical: "[T]he teaching of this Court's deci-
sions. . . enjoin[s] seeking out conflicts between state and federal regu-
lation where none clearly exists."'
179
At least two arguments suggest that the Cartwright Act's provision
for indirect purchaser treble damages remedy conflicts with basic fed-
eral antitrust policy and therefore is preempted. 80 First, it may be ar-
California Legislature Steers the Antitrust Cart Right Offthe Illinois Brick Road, 11 PAC. L.J.
121 (1978).
171. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 3. See generally FLYNN, supra note 137, at 56-108.
172. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31, 233 (1947).
173. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1962). See
generally FLYNN, supra note 137, at 1-19; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378-
79 (1978).
174. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
175. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
176. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363-65 (1976); see also Allen-Bradley Local No.
1111 v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.S. 740, 746 (1942).
177. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-56 (1971).
178. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); DeCanas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 n.5 (1976); Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See generally FLYNN, supra note 137, at 1-19.
179. Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960); see also Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130-31 (1978); Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
35, 45-46 (1966).
180. Most commentators have said that state antitrust laws, such as the Cartwright Act,
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gued that the Illinois Brick rule barring indirect purchaser damage
recoveries is an enunciation of a clear federal policy that only direct
purchasers should recover for antitrust violations that occur in inter-
state commerce regardless of plaintiff rights under state law. A state's
provision of an indirect purchaser's remedy would be a direct frustra-
tion of such a federal policy. Second, it may be argued that allowing
multiple treble damages frustrates both a general policy against dupli-
cative penalties and a specific antitrust policy against such remedies.
This related argument maintains that, if the state law seems to permit a
duplicative penalty, it frustrates basic antitrust policy against multiple
penalties and thus is preempted.
81
The argument that Illinois Brick states an important federal policy
that only direct purchasers can recover damages for antitrust violations
takes the holding of that case far beyond its stated rationale. The Illi-
nois Brick Court's rationale focused on the need to facilitate federal
antitrust suits and cited factors such as ease of judicial administration
and avoidance of evidentiary burdens to support its decision.' 8 2 Fur-
thermore, the Court in Illinois Brick was influenced by the stare decisis
effect of Hanover Shoe in reaching its decision.'8 3 Thus, as Illinois
Brick was concerned with judicial economy and the stare decisis effect
of prior interpretations of federal statutes, the case would not seem to
bar a state legislature from determining that state courts are permitted
to allow damages to indirect purchasers.
Several policies enunciated by the Illinois Brick Court, however,
may be offended by indirect purchaser suits in state court. To allow
indirect purchasers to sue in state court may lessen the incentive of
direct purchasers to sue in federal court. The Court in Illinois Brick
reasoned that allowing indirect purchasers to sue in federal courts
would erode the efficacy of the private enforcement of the antitrust
are not preempted. See note 137 supra. Several commentators, however, have reserved this
conclusion in a situation in which multiple penalties may occur. See note 168 supra.
181. A third, related preemption argument is that the state suits are in conflict with the
multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976), because state suits are im-
mune to MDL transfer procedures unless they are removable to federal court. Accordingly,
the federal policy favoring consolidation of litigation is frustrated by allowing state actions.
See Three J Farms v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423 at 76,550
(D.S.C. 1979), rev'don other grounds, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911
(1980). This argument exceeds the scope of the MDL process. The statute is not an all-
purpose consolidation vehicle, but operates within the normal jurisdictional guidelines of
the federal courts without any necessary impact on the state's right to provide a forum for
litigation. See Bancohio Corp. v. Fox, 516 F.2d 29,32 (6th Cir. 1975). See general, Weigel,
The Judicial Panel on Multlidistrict Litigation Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78
F.R.D. 575 (1978); Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87
HARv. L. Rnv. 1001 (1974).
182. See 431 U.S. at 737-43.
183. See id at 736.
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laws.'8 4 However, the mere possibility that this lessened incentive
would result from concurrent state regulation seems too hypothetical to
find a conflict justifying preemption. Thus, except for the possibility of
multiple recoveries, discussed below, and the hypothetical possibility of
a lessening of the deterrence power of private antitrust enforcement,
the grounds for Illinois Brick's rule barring indirect purchaser recov-
eries involved considerations limited to the, operation of the federal
courts in administering relief under federal statutes.
No compelling reason for extending the decision's rule to limit the
operation of state antitrust laws can be elicited from the decision. The
court's main concern was with the operation of the federal courts in
administering relief under federal statutes. Illinois Brick may be inter-
preted to show that the federal courts prefer not to entertain the diffi-
culties of litigating indirect purchaser actions. As this policy is not
frustrated by California's decision to litigate those claims, the Cart-
wright Act should not be found preempted by Illinois Brick.
Illinois Brick arguably also establishes an affirmative right of de-
fendants to be immune from antitrust damages actions by indirect pur-
chasers. According to this argument, the Cartwright Act deprives the
defendant of a federal right or immunity when it allows a suit by indi-
rect purchasers. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,185 however,
the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument that an exemption to
the Robinson-Patman Act' 86 prevented a state from regulating price
discrimination more rigorously than the federal exemption would have
allowed. Thus, the Supreme Court refused to hold that Congress, by
exempting certain behavior from federal regulations, intended to pre-
empt state laws that regulated that behavior. 187 Applying this reason-
ing to the Cartwright Act, the indirect purchaser remedy should not be
held preempted solely because federal law immunized defendants from
suits brought by indirect purchasers under federal law. The fact that
federal law protects defendants from damages actions by indirect pur-
chasers under federal law does not necessarily mean that state laws al-
lowing such a recovery are preempted.
A more persuasive argument for preemption is that an important
federal policy against imposing multiple damages penalties is frus-
trated if a state judgment allowing recovery by indirect purchasers re-
sults in cumulative treble damages. There are indications that the
Supreme Court disfavors multiple treble damages under the Sherman
184. See id at 745-47.
185. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
186. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976).
187. The Court explained: "[I]t is illogical to infer that by excluding certain competitive
behavior from the general ban against discriminatory pricing, Congress intended to preempt
the State's power to prohibit any conduct within that exclusion." 437 U.S. at 132.
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Act.188 The need to avoid multiple treble damages was one of the prin-
cipal bases for Illinois Brick.189 An important balance is struck in the
antitrust laws between deterring violations and encouraging competi-
tion,190 which may be upset by awarding damages in excess of treble
damages.19'
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether cumulative treble
damages penalties would constitute a fundamental conflict between
state and federal antitrust laws, which would preempt state law. How-
ever, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 92 in which the Court found that a state
sedition statute was preempted, the Court commented: "Without com-
pelling indication to the contrary, we will not assume that Congress
intended to permit the possibility of double punishment."'' 93 In con-
trast to this dictum is dictum from California v. Zook, 194 a case involv-
ing possible double punishment under legislation involving interstate
commerce. In Zook, the Court refused to allow a threat of multiple
punishment to be a persuasive indication of congressional intent to pre-
empt concurrent state regulation.19 5 Unlike Nelson, which involved se-
188. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 730-31 & n.11; Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1972).
189. See 431 U.S. at 730-31.
190. See Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573, 586-87 (3d
Cir. 1979).
191. Cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441-42 (1978) (crimi-
nal sanctions only imposed for violations Congress has determined violate antitrust laws);
Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equipment Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976);
(standing to sue for treble damages should be applied only when plaintiff is one "whose
protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws;" too broad an interpretation
might "result in an overkill ... far exceeding that contemplated by Congress"); Jeffry v.
Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); Calderone Enterprises v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971) (same).
Recently, in Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981), the Supreme
Court held that the Sherman Act could not be interpreted to compel contribution among
antitrust violators. Id at 646-47. The lack of a right to contribution may result in individual
defendants having to pay far greater than treble the injury flowing from their activities, and
may result in crippling a violator to such an extent that it may never again be a viable
competitor. Although the Court mentioned the policy against burdensome awards, see id at
636-37, the policy had no bearing on the Court's determination of whether Congress in-
tended to allow contribution. The policy against burdensome awards did not control in
Texas Industries, and perhaps it would not control in the more rigorous context of preemp-
tion analysis.
192. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
193. Id at 509-10. The Court based its decision on three grounds. First, the federal
regulations were found to be so pervasive that congressional intent to supplant state regula-
tion was inferred. Id at 502-03. Second, the state law needlessly legislated in an area of
primary federal jurisdiction. Id at 504. Third, enforcement of the state laws presented a
serious danger of conflicting with the administration of the federal laws in an area in which
uniformity of enforcement was required. Id at 504-05.
194. 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
195. Id at 737.
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dition, however, Zook involved highway regulations, which is an area
falling within the state's traditional police powers.
196
It is difficult to reach conclusions from these two cases because
neither decision rested on the Court's dictum regarding the danger of
multiple penalties. 97 Furthermore, both involved criminal sanctions,
while the sanctions involved in the antitrust laws are civil, despite their
punitive qualities. Nonetheless, there is an arguable federal policy
against the award of greater than treble damages for a single antitrust
violation under the Sherman Act. This policy reflects a general federal
goal of encouraging effective competition.198 Thus, arguably a state's
award of a cumulative treble damages penalty would be in conflict with
basic federal antitrust policy and thus preempted.
The tentative conclusion that an actual cumulative treble damages
award may be preempted differs from the proposition that the possibil-
ity of a cumulative treble damages award compels the immediate pre-
emption of the Cartwright Act because of its indirect purchaser
remedy. There is a strong presumption against premature findings of
conflicts between state and federal law.' 99 Hypothetical or speculative
conflicts between state and federal law are insufficient to warrant
preemption.
20°
The apparent danger of multiple treble damages penalties should
be deemed too hypothetical to support a finding of preemption. The
196. See id at "734-35.
197. The Court refused to find preemption in Zook, 336 U.S. at 737-38, and in Nelson its
finding of preemption was based on other grounds. 350 U.S. at 502-05. The dicta in the two
cases have been reconciled two ways. The first method of reconciliation is a result-oriented
analysis that focuses on the difference in the penalties involved in the two cases-Nelson's
criminal sanctions were much more serious than those involved in Zook. Rubin, Rethinking
StateAntitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 685 n.212 (1974); Note, The Commerce
Clause and State Antitrust Regulations, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1492 (1961). The second
method of reconciliation, suggested by the Court's reasoning in Nelson, is that the state
statute involved in Nelson sanctioned offenses against the same sovereign, the United States,
as did the federal sedition statute. See 350 U.S. at 499-504. In Zook, the Court emphasized
that the concept of offenses against separate sovereigns did not implicate constitutional con-
sideration of double jeopardy and that the state's regulation of local effects of interstate
commerce did not conflict with Congress' interstate regulation. 336 U.S. at 731. Application
of the first reconciliation to a real award of multiple treble damages suggests that the Court
may strike down the state law. The magnitude of multiple treble damages awards for a
nationwide industry is staggering. The second method of reconciliation suggests that, be-
cause the two sovereigns are protecting separate parties and furthering similar but separate
policies, the imposition of multiple damages awards would be permitted.
198. See Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573, 586-87 (3d
Cir. 1979).
199. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130-31 (1978); Seagram
& Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966).
200. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130-31 (1978); Seagram




state courts and the federal courts could interpret their antitrust laws to
prevent cumulative penalties. Federal courts typically defer to state
courts for interpretation of the state laws,20 1 thereby allowing the state
court to interpret the state law to lessen or negate apparent conflict be-
tween the state and federal laws.
20 2
The Cartwright Act and Sherman Act may be reconciled by the
courts to prevent multiple damages awards. Both statutes traditionally
have led to active judicial interpretation of their provisions in changing
economic and judicial circumstances. 20 3 A reconciliation of the two
statutes by the federal and state courts is possible. Moreover, the fed-
eral and California parenspatriae statutes 204 indicate that the federal
and state legislatures may be willing to provide for a set-off in a dam-
ages award to account for a prior judgment. Although theseparenspa-
trine statutes do not apply to actions by private plaintiffs, 205 they
indicate that set-offs for prior awards against the same defendants may
be possible. Thus, the possibility that the operation of two statutes can
be reconciled to avoid multiple treble damages awards makes conflict
between the two statutes merely hypothetical and unripe for a holding
that the Cartwright Act is preempted.
206
201. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,363-65 (1976); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v.
Wisconsin Board, 315 U.S. 740, 747 (1942).
202. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363-65 (1976); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v.
Wisconsin Board, 315 U.S. 740, 748 (1942). Additionally, the majority of antitrust cases are
settled before trial. See Furth & Burns, The Anatomy of a Seventy Million Dollar Sherman
Act Settlement-A Law Professor's Tape-Talk with Plaintifts Trial Counsel, 23 DEPAUL L.
REv. 865, 880 (1974); Renfrew, Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny of Settlements in Civil and
CriminalAntitrust Cases, 70 F.R.D. 495, 495-96 (1976) (90% of private treble damages ac-
tions settled before trial in fiscal 1975). Thus, it is unlikely that cumulative treble damages
will be awarded in many cases. Furthermore, it is possible that defendants who are sub-
jected to actual duplicative penalties will be able to utilize theories of unjust enrichment or
interpleader to prevent having to actually pay the overlapping penalties. See generally Note,
The Debate Over the Passing-On Concept inAntitrust Law: Is It Finally Settled?, 15 HoUs. L.
REv. 199, 211 (1977); Note, Anti-Trust Law-Private Actions: The Supreme Court Bars
Treble-Damage Suits by Indirect Purchasers, 56 N.C.L. REV. 341, 350-51 (1978). As one
federal court put it, "As before, defendants exagerate the threat they face. Double liability
can result only if all plaintiffi prevail on the overlapping issues, and only if the state court
plaintiffs further establish the presence of a 'pass on'. These are speculative dangers at best."
In re Industrial Gas Litigation, No. 80-C-3479 slip. op. at 43 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 1981)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order Certifying Plaintiffs Class at 43).
203. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 105, at 12-14 (1978).
204. The federalparens patriae statute provides that the court shall "exclude from the
amount of monetary relief awarded in such action any amount of monetary relief (A) which
duplicates amounts which have been awarded for the same injury, or (B) which is properly
applicable to (i) natural persons who have excluded their claims ... and (ii) any business
entity." 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976). The Californiaparenspatriae statute, contains identi-
cal language. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16760(a)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16760 (West Supp. 1981).
206. Even without a limiting construction of the statutes, the Cartwright Act could be
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The hypothetical danger of multiple treble damages penalties does
not mandate the conclusion that the Cartwright Act is preempted be-
cause of its remedy for indirect purchasers. Nonetheless, the Sherman
Act is in tension with the Cartwright Act. How that tension will be
resolved is unclear, but the teachings of the Supreme Court indicate
that the proper resolution of that tension is not a finding of federal
preemption at this stage of the Cartwright Act's development.
Conclusion
Basic differences between California and federal class action pro-
cedures and antitrust statutes illustrate that the California state courts
are more receptive to antitrust consumer class actions than the federal
courts. Differences between class action procedures favor consumer
classes in the California courts. The substantive difference between the
antitrust laws favor the indirect purchaser under the California Cart-
wright Act. Many consumer antitrust actions that can be maintained in
California state courts could never be maintained in the federal courts.
The consumer antitrust action in California's courts is not without
problems. Defendants usually seek to remove state court actions to
federal court because of the defendants' desire to consolidate actions
and the plaintiffs' difficulty in maintaining a class action in federal
court. Indirect purchaser claims are not removable on grounds of fed-
eral question jurisdiction, but the status of direct purchaser claims is in
serious doubt. Removal of direct purchaser claims could result in the
dismissal of those claims by the federal court because of the inability of
the consumer class to meet federal class action requirements.
For the indirect purchaser class that can escape removal, there re-
mains unanswered the question whether the class can or should recover
damages when a parallel federal action is litigated to a final judgment
by direct purchasers. The Sherman Act and Cartwright Act seem to
allow duplicative damages for the direct and indirect purchasers. An
actual award of multiple damages may preempt the state law, but the
current hypothetical danger of multiple penalties should not compel a
finding of federal preemption.
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